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The People Aspects of Innovation: Analysis of the Relationships
Between U.S. Business Entities and Their Employee and
Non-Employee Innovators and Inventors*
Arthur J. Schwab**

I.

INTRODUCTION

The legal rules that govern the relationships between firms and inven-

tors are affected 1) by the classification of the technology;' 2) by the
relationship between the inventors and the firm (i.e., whether the inventor or innovator is an employee or a non-employee); and 3) by the existence and terms of any agreements.
This Paper will discuss these legal rules and their practical effects on
firms and inventors in the United States.

II.
A.

THE FOUR CLASSIFICATIONS OF TECHNOLOGIES

Patents

The U.S. patent system is designed to provide an inventor with the
exclusive right to make, use and sell his invention for a limited period in
exchange for a disclosure of the invention which is sufficient to permit
others to use the invention after the patent rights expire. A patent application must be filed with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office within
one year of the first publication of the inventive idea or the first public
use of the inventive idea in the United States.
Patent protection is generally available for a process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof. To be patentable, a technical invention must be useful, novel
and non-obvious. The requirement that an invention be non-obvious is a
rigorous standard which excludes from protection those inventions
which, although new, would have been obvious to a hypothetical person
of ordinary skill in the application art, who is deemed to have access to
all prior public knowledge in that art.
A U.S. utility patent (applicable to technical subject matter) lasts
* © Arthur J. Schwab 1989
** Partner, Deputy Head of Litigation, Founding Chairman TECHLEX Group, Reed, Smith,

Shaw & McClay.
I Technology will generally fall under one or more of the following four classifications: patented products, copyrighted works, computer chip (mask) works, or trade secrets and other confidential information.
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seventeen years from its date of issuance and permits the patentee to foreclose all others from the practice of the invention in the United States.
This right to exclude even applies to those who independently arrive at
the same invention. This significantly differentiates a patent from computer chip, trade secret and copyright protection, where an independent
developer cannot be foreclosed. However, the grant of a patent does not
provide the patentee with the affirmative right to practice under his own
patent; such practice might still infringe upon the patent rights of another. Likewise, a U.S. patent does not foreclose others from practicing
under the patent in other countries. Foreign patent rights must be obtained for this purpose.
Under U.S. patent law, patent protection is barred for any invention
which is publicly used in the United States or made the subject of a publication anywhere in the world more than one year prior to the filing date
of a U.S. patent application. Thus, a delay in filing of more than one year
after any of these critical events will forfeit all possibility of U.S. patent
protection. Further, and of ever-increasing importance, is the fact that
most foreign countries do not recognize the one year "grace period" of
U.S. law and instead require absolute novelty.2
B.

Copyrights

Copyright protection is provided under federal law and applies to
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression
from which they can be perceived or communicated.
Copyright protection provides the author with the exclusive right to
make copies or derivatives of the copyrighted work. However, copyright
law protects only the form or manner of expression of a work, rather
than the ideas or concepts embodied within the work. Further, copyright only protects against copying, so one who independently creates a
similar work cannot be foreclosed by the copyright owner. Thus, the
scope of copyright protection is relatively narrow and will be inappropriate for the protection of ideas or concepts.3
Copyright protection for the literal elements of computer programs
in both source and object code is available.4 However, the courts are
split as to whether the other elements (i.e., the "structure, sequence and
origination") of computer programs are protectable.'
2 W. SMITH,

R.

VICKERY, JR.,

T.

WETrACH &

A.

SCHWAB, LAW AND TECHNOLOGY TRANS-

FER, AN ANALYSIS OF THE LAWS AFFECTING BUSINESSES ENGAGED IN THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY 6-7
3 Id. at

(1984) [hereinafter LAW AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER].
9-10.
4 Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3rd Cir. 1986), cert.
dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984); Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir.
1982).
5 Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F.Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex.
1978); Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratories, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1031 (1987); see also, Healthcare Affiliated Services v. Lippany, No. 88 Civ. 1240 (W.D. Pa.
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Copyright is obtained by reducing a concept to tangible form and it
is protected by the copyright act in effect at that time. If the work is
published it must have a copyright notice affixed to the work. Registration with the Copyright Office is not required to obtain copyright protection, but registration is required before a federal court will enforce the
copyright.6
C. Mask Works
On November 8, 1984, President Reagan signed into law the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 ("1984 Act"). The 1984 Act
creates a new, sui generis form of intellectual property protection for
computer chips. It gives designers of new semiconductor chip products
the exclusive right to reproduce and distribute their products or "mask
works" within the United States, and the exclusive right to import the
protected chips into the United States, for a period of ten years from the
date the work is registered or from the date the work is first exploited
anywhere in the world, whichever occurs first.
To obtain protection for a mask work, the owner must apply to the
Register of Copyrights within two years after the date the work is first
commercially exploited anywhere in the world. If the Register of Copyrights is satisfied that the work is entitled to protection, and most will be,
the Register will register the claims and issue a certificate of protection to
the applicant under the seal of the Copyright Office.
Unlike copyrighted works, the affixation of notice of registration is
not a condition of protection for mask works, but constitutes prima facie
notice of protection for the work. Notice may be given by affixing to the
mask or chip the words "mask work," the symbol *M*, or the symbol E
along with the name of the owner of the work.
The owner of the mask work has the right to exclude others from: 1)
reproducing the mask or the chip; 2) importing chip products embodying
the work; or 3) inducing or knowingly causing others to do 1) or 2).
The remedies for infringing a mask owner's rights include granting:
1) injunctions to restrain infringement; 2) awards of actual damages plus
the infringer's profits (to the extent such profits were not used in calculating damages); 3) statutory damages of up to $250,000 in lieu of actual
damages and profits; 4) destruction of the infringing chip products; and
5) attorney's fees and costs to the prevailing party in the court's
discretion.
The use of mask rights applies only to semiconductor chips and the
masks or stencils used in making them. The legislative history of the
Aug. 11, 1988) (The court granted a preliminary injunction to plaintiff, despite fact that plaintiff did
not conclusively prove that the defendant infringed upon its copyright, because defendant had violated employment agreement when he used information he learned from the plaintiff to start his own
computer software business and to create his software).
6 Law and Technology Transfer, supra note 2, at 9-10.
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Chip Act suggests that the availability of mask protection precludes
copyright protection for semiconductor chips. The program encoded on
the chip, as embodied in tape or disk, however, would still be
copyrightable.
Recent case law suggests that in order to prove infringement of a
mask work, the chip owner must establish that the allegedly infringing
chip is substantially similar to the protected chip. However, reverse engineering is a complete defense to infringement, and is usually established
by the defendant producing a "paper trail" establishing significant revenue expenditures and engineering efforts as opposed to outright copying
of the chip. Once the defendant produces such a paper trail, the standard
of infringement rises to one of "substantial identity" rather than "substantial similarity."
D.

Trade Secrets

Trade secret protection is founded on state law and common law, as
opposed to patent, copyright, computer chip mask work and trademark
law which is federal in origin. For this reason, the scope of trade secret
protection varies from state to state.
"Trade secrets" include virtually any valuable business technology
and information which has value, is not generally known in the trade and
is maintained in substantial secrecy by the owner thereof. Thus, formulas, patterns, devices, processes, compilations of information, customer
lists, credit ratings, methods of doing business, plans and designs may all
be protectable subject matter. This is a considerably broader category of
protectable matter than is recognized under the patent laws.
However, because a trade secret loses its protectable status when it
becomes generally known, many types of inventive ideas are wholly inappropriate for protection under trade secret law. Particularly, any concept which will be disclosed to the public through its anticipated use will
be unprotectable under trade secret law and should be considered for
patent protection.
There is an area of overlap where either trade secret or patent protection will be available, e.g., a process which is to be used in-house and
which cannot be determined from analysis of the product resulting from
the process would be protectable under either. It must be pointed out,
however, that the decision must be made within a certain time frame so
as not to lose the opportunity to file a patent application.
The principal advantage in favor of trade secret protection is that
the duration of protection is potentially longer; protection lasts as long as
the technology or information remains secret versus seventeen years for
patents. It also is less expensive in the short-term because no application
needs to be prepared and filed. However, trade secret law does not provide any rights against one who obtains the information through proper
means, e.g., through independent discovery. Thus, trade secret protec-
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tion may vanish suddenly, whereas patent protection is considerably
more certain, once obtained. Likewise, if the company fails to maintain
appropriate security measures, the trade secret can be lost through the
company's own acts or most frequently by a former employee.
It is, therefore, prudent for a company to treat all inventive ideas
from the time of conception to the time that a patent is ready to be issued
as if only trade secret protection were available. In this manner, the
company can defer for several years the final decision concerning
whether a patent application should be filed or whether trade secret protection is desired, during which time more insight into the marketplace
can be collected. If at that time, trade secret protection is desired, the
patent application can be purposely abandoned; the trade secret status of
the concept being retained because patent applications are maintained in
secret by the Patent Office.7

III.
A.

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN FIRMS AND THEIR EMPLOYEE
INNOVATORS AND INVENTORS

Patents
1. General Rule

The general rule in the United States is that an individual inventor
owns the patent rights to an invention, even though the invention was
created during the course of employment. This rule is subject to three
exceptions.
2.

Employee Hired to Invent Exception

The first exception is that an employer owns the inventions developed by an employee who was specifically hired to use his "inventive
faculties" in an area.' If, however, the employee is only hired to make
improvements in a designated area, the employee owns the patent rights,
unless there is an express agreement to the contrary. This distinction is a
fine line and the employer has the burden of proof on this issue.9
3.

Shop Right Exception

The second exception to the general rule is that a shop right in favor
of the employer may arise whenever an employee uses his employer's
resources or facilities to create an invention or to reduce it to practice. 10
The shop right is not an ownership right in the patent, rather it is a nonexclusive," royalty free, non-transferable"2 license to use the invention
7 Id. at 12-13.
8 5 D. CHISUM, PATENTS § 22.03[2] (1987).
9 Id.
10 Id. § 22.03[3].

11 Id. § 22.03[3][d].
12 Id. § 22.03[3][c].
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given to the inventor's employer.
4.

Contractual Exception

The resulting confusion created by the two previously mentioned
exceptions has prompted many modem U.S. employers to use the contractual exception to the general rule that the individual employee or
inventor owns the patent rights to an invention. Firms use the contractual exception in two ways. First, they often require their employees who
are most likely to invent to sign patent assignment agreements. 13 Second, they often develop employee suggestion programs to acquire the
rights to patents which are developed by their employees, but which are
not covered by their patent assignment agreements.
Most patent assignment agreements between employers and employees contain three general clauses. First, they require the employee to
assign all inventions to the employer. Some agreements limit this obligation to only those inventions that are made in the actual course of the
inventor's research, while other agreements include inventions which are
unrelated to the employer's business and which were developed independently by the employed inventor. In addition, some agreements may require the employee to assign inventions made for a certain time after
leaving the employer. Second, the agreements usually stipulate that the
employee or inventor must cooperate with his employer in disclosing inventive activity. Third, the employee usually must promise to cooperate
in any patent prosecution activities. Often, the only consideration given
by the employer in return for these promises is the inventor's salary.' 4
Generally, these assignment clauses are grouped with post-employment restrictive covenants (covenants not to compete), trade secret
clauses and copyright ownership restrictions, where applicable.
"The current trend in [U.S.] courts is to attempt to balance perceived inequities in bargaining position between employers and employees, and to limit the inventions covered by employment agreements to
those in which the employer has a legitimate and justified business
interest."' 5
In addition to this judicial response, several states have passed "freedom to create" statutes.' 6 These statutes limit the types of inventions
that an employer may contractually require an employee to assign. 7
Second, employers often develop suggestion programs to encourage
suggestions from those who are not hired to create. Employers often
13 Coolley, Is It Time to Change Your Client's Employment Agreements, 31 PRAC. LAW. 17
(Dec. 1, 1985).
14 Id. at 17.

15 Id. at 18-19.
16 Gullette, Fact or Fiction: Legislative Control ofEmployer-Employee Ownership Rights in Inventions and Other Intellectual Property, 1985 PAT. L. ANN. § 7.01[2].
17 Coolley, supra note 13, at 18.
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design these programs so as to acquire the rights to any ideas developed
by these employees and to acquire the rights to any ideas created by an
employee who has signed a patent
assignment agreement, but which does
18
not cover the idea in question.
Under most plans the employer first solicits suggestions from its employees through the publication of the plan. The employees then submit
their suggestions to the employer, who usually has the discretion to accept or reject the suggestion. If the employer decides to accept the idea it
pays the employee under the plan. This payment is the consideration for
the assignment and it is often based on a portion of the cost savings or
profit increases for the employer resulting from the suggestion.19
B.

Copyrights
1. General Rule

Statutory copyright "vests initially in the author or authors of the
work." ° Thus, the general rule is that if an employee develops a work
the employee, not his employer, owns the copyright.
2.

"Work Made for Hire" Exception

If the work was produced in a made for hire situation, "the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the
author for [copyright] purposes ... and, unless the parties have expressly
agreed otherwise in a written instrument
signed by them, owns all of the
' 21
rights comprised in the copyright.
The Copyright Act defines "work made for hire" as either "a work
prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment," or
certain works specially ordered or commissioned. 2 The "work made for
hire" doctrine in the context of employees will be described in this subsection. The doctrine in the context of all other creators will be treated
in Section IV of this Paper.
The two main issues under the "work made for hire" doctrine are
whether a relationship exists between an employee and the employer, and
if so, whether the work was prepared within the scope of the relationship.
The critical determinant of whether the relationship exists is
whether the alleged employer has the right to supervise and direct the
manner in which the author performs his work. This test is a particularized application of general agency law. Under this doctrine it is not relevant whether the putative employee is a regular employee or not and the
18 Coolley, An Update: Employee Suggestion Programs,69 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 503 (Spr. 1987).
19 Id.
20 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1982).
21 Id. § 201(b). Even if the parties expressly agree otherwise only the ownership of the copyright, not the other legal consequences arising out of the "work made for hire" status, is affected.
See 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §§ 5.03[D], 5.03[A] (1987).
22 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
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nature of his compensation is not always determinative.23
To determine whether the work was within the sphere of the employment relationship, courts conduct a factual inquiry into the scope of
the employee's duties. If the work was not within the scope of these
duties, the employee holds the copyright to the work, even where the
subject matter of the work arose out of the employee's activities for his
employer, and where a portion of the work was done during working
hours with the assistance of the employer's personnel.2 4
To avoid this result, employers sometimes require employees to sign
written agreements stating that all work produced by the employee, even
work outside the scope of the employment relationship, is considered
"work made for hire." Because "work made for hire" must be "within
the scope of [employee's] employment," these clauses will not convert all
of the employee's work into "work made for hire." Instead, courts construe these clauses as simple transfers of copyrights from the employee to
the employer.25 In the absence of such a clause, statutory copyright to
work produced by an employee outside of the scope of his employment
relationship vests in the employee.
C

Trade Secrets
1. Trade Secrets Law in Absence of a Written Agreement

Trade secret law, in the context of employers and their employees, is
based upon pre-resignation and post-resignation fiduciary and common
law duties that an employee owes to his employer. These duties exist in
addition to any contractual duties that may exist between the employee
and employer.
Generally, prior to resignation an employee is under a duty to exercise the utmost degree of care towards his employer.2 6 After resignation
the ex-employee has a duty to his employer not to use or disclose to third
persons trade secrets that may harm his former employer.2 7
U.S. courts will generally enforce these pre-resignation and post-resignation duties against the employee if the trade secrets were developed
by the employer and then disclosed to the employee or if the trade secrets
were developed by an employee and pertained to the employee's work.2 8
23 M. NIMMER, supra note 21 at § 5.03 [B][l][a].
24 Id. § 5.03[B][1][b][i].

25 Id. § 5.03[B][1][b][ii]. The importance of this distinction is that although these clauses
transfer the copyrights, they do not trigger the other legal consequences which flow from the "work
made for hire" status.
26 Connelly v. Balkwill, 160 Ohio St. 430, 116 N.E.2d 701 (1954).
27 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 396 (1958). See generally, A. SCHWAB, How To
PROTECT YOUR INVESTMENT IN TECHNOLOGY AND EMPLOYEES THROUGH CONTRACTS AND LITIGATION - EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS AND COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE 15-17 (1989) (on file
at Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law).

28 Bell, Quitting to Start Your Own Company, IEEE SPECTRUM, Sept. 1987, at 3.
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2. Post-employment Restrictive Covenants and Confidentiality
and Non-disclosure Agreements
Despite the protection afforded by these pre-resignation and postresignation duties, employers who seek the minimum amount of disruption from trade secret infringement often require their employees to enter
into written employment agreements which delineate precisely the ownership rights of trade secrets.2 9
These agreements usually contain two different contractual provisions. The first is a post-employment restrictive covenant that prohibits a
former employee from competing against the former employer. 30 The
second provision is a confidentiality and non-disclosure agreement that
protects the former employer from the unauthorized use or disclosure of
trade secrets or technical information, data or material which its employee had created or had access to during his employment.3 1
A valid post-employment restrictive covenant, a covenant not to
compete, may be enforced by an injunction preventing an ex-employee
from using his technological knowledge in competition against his former
employer. Alternatively or additionally, an employer may be permitted
to recover money damages resulting from an employee's breach of a postemployment restrictive covenant.
Restrictive covenants, however, are viewed as a type of restraint of
trade. A post-employment covenant not to compete will be enforced
only if it is ancillary to an employment agreement, and is reasonably
limited to such time, territory and activities as may be reasonably necessary for the protection of a legitimate interest of the employer, without
imposing undue hardship on the employee.
Contracts in restraint of trade made independent of a contract of
employment are void as against public policy; to be enforceable, a postemployment restrictive covenant must be ancillary to an employment
agreement.
A restrictive covenant is viewed as ancillary if it is entered into at
the time of initial employment. Problems may arise, though, when an
employer seeks to enforce a covenant not to compete signed after the
employee has been on the job for a time. The restrictive covenant will be
held invalid if it is found that the employee received no benefit in return
for signing the post-employment restrictive covenant. In some states, the
fact that the employee retains his job is deemed to be a benefit sufficient
to support enforceability of the covenant. In many other jurisdictions,
however, the employee must receive some substantial change in position
29 Schwab, High-Tech Brings New Language to Employment Contracts, EXECUTIVE REP.
MAG. 44 (July 1988).
30 A. SCHWAB, How To PROTECT YOUR INVESTMENT IN TECHNOLOGY AND EMPLOYEES
THROUGH CONTRACTS AND LITIGATION PROTECTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL INVESTMENT
THROUGH EMPLOYMENT AND RELATED CONTRACTS at 2 (1987).
31 Id. at 7.
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in return for his signing of the restrictive covenant or else it will not be
enforceable. Accordingly, a restrictive covenant should always be included as part of an employment contract, and when the contract is being signed by an existing employee, it should set forth what additional
benefits the employee is receiving.
To justify a restrictive covenant, an employer must have a legitimate
business interest which he is seeking protection from use or disclosure by
the ex-employee. Virtually any information not generally known in the
trade (e.g., formulas, devices, processes, plans, customer lists, methods of
doing business) may be a legitimate protectable interest. A justifiable
protectable interest may also be found where the employee has received
specialized training or has developed the capability of rendering specialized services. In many states, customer relations may be a legitimate
business interest protectable by a restrictive covenant.
A restrictive covenant will not be enforced unless the restrictions
upon the employee are reasonably limited in terms of geography, activities and time. The reasonableness of the covenant's restrictions are determined by weighing the necessity for protection of the employer against
the hardship imposed on the employee. By way of illustration, restrictions which may be reasonable when applied to an executive or skilled
technician with vast knowledge of the company's business in general and
technical information in particular may be unreasonable when applied to
a lower-level, unskilled worker. When balancing the equities between the
employer and the employee, a court will be more likely to find the restrictions are unreasonable if the employee was fired rather than if he
resigned.
Generally, a restrictive covenant is more easily enforced if the geographic limitation is tied to the territory or customers actually serviced
by the employee during his employment, or to the technology and trade
secrets disclosed to the employee. The scope of a restrictive covenant
should be limited to those activities of the employee which would pose a
legitimate threat to the employer. The time element of a restrictive covenant should be only as long as is needed for the risk of injury to the
employer by the ex-employee to be reasonably moderated.
In some states, even if the restrictions are too broad, courts may
reform the restrictive covenant to make it reasonable or may choose only
to enforce those portions of the covenant which are reasonable. However, such partial enforcement is not available everywhere, as in some
states restrictive covenants must be reasonable as written. Even in those
states which permit partial enforcement, courts will not reform a restrictive covenant that is unconscionably overbroad. Therefore, an employer
must take care to impose no greater restrictions than are necessary to
protect the legitimate business interest of the employer.32
32 A. SCHWAB, How To PROTECT YOUR INVESTMENT IN TECHNOLOGY AND EMPLOYEES
THROUGH CONTRACTS AND LITIGATION -

PROTECTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL INVESTMENT
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Along with the previously discussed post-employment restrictive
covenants, most employment contracts also contain confidentiality and
non-disclosure provisions.
Some courts have ruled that these provisions may broaden or narrow the protection the common law affords.33 Other courts have ruled
that these provisions do not provide any greater protection to the employer than do the common law or fiduciary duty requirements. Even in
these states, however, these provisions perform two useful functions.
First, they provide evidence pertaining to the need for confidentiality and
non-disclosure agreements. Second, they help define the scope of confidential information in a particular business or industry.3 4
Several courts have refused to enforce overly broad non-disclosure
and confidentiality provisions. 3 Furthermore, courts have generally
ruled that geographical limitations are inapplicable to non-disclosure and
confidentiality provisions.3 6 Moreover, courts are split as to whether the
absence of a reasonable time limitation in the provisions render the provisions void.37
IV.

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN FIRMS AND NON-EMPLOYEE
INVENTORS AND CREATORS

Firms acquire the rights to technology developed by non-employees
in three general ways. First, and most importantly, firms acquire their
rights through a license with the inventor. Secondly, firms sometimes
acquire the rights through an assignment. Finally, a firm automatically
acquires the copyright to any "work made for hire."
A.

The Legal Distinction between a License and an Assignment

Generally, the distinction between a license of technology and the
assignment thereof is a fine line. In making this distinction courts do not
rely on the names that parties affix to the agreements. Rather, they examine the putative license or assignment to determine the legal significance of the transfer agreement.3 8 The characterization of a transfer as a
THROUGH EMPLOYMENT AND RELATED CONTRACTS at 2-5 (1987). See id. at 5-6 for other provisions that employers often insert into employment agreements containing post-employment restrictive covenants. See A. SCHVAB, How TO PROTECT YOUR INVESTMENT IN TECHNOLOGY AND
EMPLOYEES THROUGH CONTRACTS AND LITIGATION - EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS AND COVE-

NANTS NOT TO COMPETE (1987) for an exhaustive state by state discussion of post-employment
restrictive covenants.
33 A. SCHVAB, How To PROTECT YOUR INVESTMENT IN TECHNOLOGY AND EMPLOYEES
THROUGH CONTRACTS AND LITIGATION - SPECIAL ISSUES - COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE
AND ADDITIONAL PROTECTION PROVISIONS at 14-15 (1987).

34
35
36
37

Id. at 13.
Id. at 16-17.
Id. at 17.
Id.

38 1 H. EINHORN, PATENT LICENSING TRANSACTIONS § 1.01[l][a] (1988). For a good discus-

sion of the distinction between patent assignments and patent licenses see 60 AM. JUR. 2D Patents
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license, rather than an assignment, has several important legal
consequences.
In the context of the transfer of patents, the distinction between licensing and assignment is relevant for two reasons. First, only assignees,
and in some cases exclusive licensees, not non-exclusive licensees, have
the right to sue infringers.39 Second, licensors are indispensable to litigious disputes concerning the validity of the patent, whereas assignors are
not.40
In the area of transfers of copyrights, the distinction between a iIcense or assignment is important for several reasons. First, courts only
permit assignees and exclusive licensees, not non-exclusive licensees, to
sue for copyright infringement.4 1 Second, assignees or exclusive licensees
have the right to re-transfer the copyright, absent any contractual restrictions. By contrast, non-exclusive licensees do not have the power to retransfer the copyright unless they have been expressly authorized to do
so. 42 Finally, the resolution of such issues as the sufficiency of the consideration,4 3 the formality requirements' and other issues45 depend on
the classification of the agreement.
Notwithstanding the legal consequences arising from the classification of an agreement as a license rather than an assignment, the practical
consequences of the two are very similar and the distinction between the
two is often blurred in practice.
B.

Common ProvisionsFound in Licensing Agreements

A license may be exclusive or non-exclusive. Although economists
generally agree that non-exclusive licenses yield the highest return for the
licensor, it may be very difficult for a licensor to attract a licensee without an exclusive license.4 6 Often licenses restrict the rights of the licensee
to particular geographical territories or to certain fields, or they quantitatively limit the scope of the license grant. Also included in some licenses
are prohibitions on dealing in competitive goods, price limitations and
style limitations.4 7
Many licenses grant more than one type of right. Patent rights are
§ 1167 (1987). See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 21 §§ 10.02[A], 10.01[A] (1987), for a discussion of
the distinction between copyright assignments and copyright licenses under both the current Copyright Act and the 1909 Act.
39 1 H. EINHORN, supra note 38 § 1.01[1l][b] (1988).
40 Id.
41 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 21 § 10.02[B][1] (1987).
42 Id. § 10.02[B][4].

43 Id. § 10.02[B][5].
44Id.
45 Id. § 10.02[C].
46 Schroeder, Licensing ofRights to IntellectualProperty, 50 ALB. L. REV. 455, 456-57 (1986).
47 Sommel, Patent License Restrictions, 59 CONN. L. REV. 236 (1985). See also R. MILGRIM,
PROTECTING AND PROFITING FORM TRADE SECRETS (1979) at 23-30, for a discussion of various

licensing provisibns which courts may hold violate antitrust standards.
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often transferred with trade secrets, and in certain fields trademarks are
usually transferred with copyrights.4 8
Usually, the most substantial form of compensation for the licensor
is the royalty.
Patent licenses usually require the licensee to pay royalties based on
its revenues for the remaining life of the patent. They also sometimes
require the licensee to pay royalties during the period of the patent application. A promise to pay patent royalties after the termination or expiration of a patent, however, is generally unenforceable, unless a portion of
the royalties is designated as payment for non-patent "know-how." Further, since 1969, if a licensee can prove the patent is invalid, the licensee
is not liable for payments under the license.49
In general, the royalty periods for trade secrets are usually shorter
than those for patents.5 0 However, unlike a patent license, whose period
of enforceability is limited to the life of the patent, a trade secret license is
enforceable even after the trade secret becomes part of the public
domain. 1
Generally, copyright royalties are a fixed percentage of the sales revenue of the licensee during the duration of the license and reflect the
value added to the licensee by the exercise of the copyright.5 2
Sometimes licensing arrangements also stipulate that the licensee
must pay a fee or a lump sum payment to the licensor in addition to or in
lieu of the royalty payment.5 3
Many licensing arrangements also contain clauses dealing with the
following matters: 1) licensor's right to audit; 2) cross-licensing; 3) grant
backs of improvements; 4) who has the right to sue infringers; 5) indemnification of licensee by licensor; 6) powers of licensor to set and enforce
quality control standards pertaining to products produced by licensee; 7)
degree of effort required by licensee in producing and marketing product;
8) copyright and patent marking requirements of licensee; 9) effect of
bankruptcy; 10) tax consequences of the arrangement; 11) availability of
arbitration; 12) choice of forum; and 13) choice of law.5 4
C. Common ProvisionsFound in Assignment Agreements
Although there are some differences between the provisions found in
assignments as compared to licenses, for the most part the provisions in
the two agreements are very similar.
For example, most assignments, much like licenses, grant more than
48 Schroeder, supra note 46, at 457.
49 Id. at 458.
50 Id. at 459.

51 Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1969).
52 Schroeder, supra note 46, at 460.
53 Id.

54 Id. at 461-74.
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one type of intellectual property right to the transferee. Furthermore,
assignments often include clauses dealing with geographical limitations,
the right to sue infringers, the grant back of improvements, the tax consequences of the arrangement, the availability of arbitration in case of a
dispute and the choice of law and forum which are similar to their counterparts in licenses. 5
The one minor difference between the provisions in the two agreements is that the compensation paid under a license is likely to be a royalty based usually upon the licensee's revenue, whereas the compensation
paid under an assignment is usually a fixed amount, paid either in a lump
sum or in installments.5 6
D.

Policies of Firms in Regard to Unsolicited Disclosures

Firms acquire technology from non-employees in the form of assignments or licenses from both solicited and unsolicited inventors. When a
firm receives unsolicited disclosures of ideas or inventions from non-employees, the firm must guard against the claim from the inventor that it
misappropriated the idea or suggestion. Most firms protect themselves
from this problem by refusing to accept unsolicited disclosures from nonemployees until after the inventor has signed an agreement stating that
he understands the disclosure or submission is on a non-confidential
57
basis.
E.

Copyright "Work Made for Hire"

Even if a firm did not acquire any rights to a work created by a nonemployee through an assignment or a licensing arrangement, the firm
may still have the copyright to the work if it was produced as a "work
made for hire."
In the context of a non-employee creator, several requirements must
be satisfied before a work
created after January 1, 1978 is considered a
"work made for hire." 58 First, the work must have been specially ordered or commissioned. 9 Second, the work must fall within one of the
nine "work made for hire" categories." Finally, a written agreement
must exist between the commissioning party and the non-employee creator stating that the work is "work made for hire."'" If the work satisfies
55 See generally 60 AM. JUR. 2D Patents § 1172 (1987).
56 However, in Coast Metals, Inc. v. Cape, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 154 (D.N.J. 1979), the court
upheld an assignment payment provision that was based upon the sales volume of the assignee. The
court equated this arrangement with a fixed sum installment arrangement and held that the agreement was not against public policy.
57 O'Brien, Establishinga Company Policy and Programfor Intellectual Property Rights, 50
ALB. L. REV. 539, 551-52 (1986).
58 See I M. NIMMER, supra note 21 § 5.03[B][2]c] for work created before January 1, 1978.
59 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
6 Id.
61 Id.
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all of these requirements all of the legal consequences arising as a result
of the "work made for hire" status apply.62
V.

CONCLUSION

As is evident from the foregoing, the legal rules governing the acquisition of technology by firms from innovators and inventors, and the resulting practical relationships created by these rules, are shaped by three
main factors. First, the characterization of the technology as either a
trade secret, a patented product, a mask work or a copyrighted work, or
a combination of these, is very relevant. Second, the status of the innovator or inventor as either an employee or non-employee, or possibly a nonemployee creator in a "work made for hire" situation, affects the relationship. The third determinative factor is the possible existence and
terms of an agreement between the acquiring firm and the inventor pertaining to the invention or innovation. A familiarity with these three
factors assists in achieving an understanding of the complex relationships
that exist between firms and their inventors in the United States.

62 See 1 M. NiMMER, supra note 21, § 5.03[A] for these legal consequences.

